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No. 1

What an Investing Shareholder Should Know
THE typical stockholder, in whose behalf the sentimental agitators are
waging such vigorous warfare, probably
is the one least worried over the possible
tendency to disenfranchise him. Practically, he is concerned with the extent
and regularity of dividends, with the
safety of his investment, with the exchange value of his stock, and with its
marketability.
Given these, he cares
little whether or not he votes. He will
avoid it if possible, responding usually to
the second request for proxies sent out
by the corporation officials.
The atypical stockholder sends proxies
to no one. He attends the meetings in
person. He makes speeches and protests
often over some insignificant or unimportant matter. He is heard respectfully, his
protest may be recorded, but judging from
outward appearances he might as well
have saved his time and breath.
These illustrations do not apply to cases
wherein the shares are closely held. The
use of shares in such cases is confined generally to gaining advantage in personal
squabbles which develop between factions. No public spirited champions of
democracy are needed in the premises.
The attorneys usually look after the legal
rights of the parties.
The typical shareholder whose interests

are being so zealously conserved is the individual who owns ten shares of "Strumo."
A sorry spectacle he would make of attempting to exercise effectively the proprietary right of voice in the management with which theoretically he becomes
vested by reason of stock ownership.
In modern corporation procedure, theory
and practice often clash; practice usually
wins.
The wrong of non-voting stock, as the
matter is viewed by the average citizen,
lies in the fact that any possibility of
organizing a minority group to the point
of making its voice heard is irretrievably
removed. Natural human pride which
might cause an individual to resent being
denied the right to vote, perhaps would be
conversely affected if the right were to be
extended even though there might be no
practical way of making the right effective.
These ruminations, however, lead to no
solution of the problem.
If there is anything in the idea that
shareholders should have the right to vote,
a new form of stock might be devised
which, while non-voting, ordinarily would
become endowed with that power automatically under certain conditions. Thus,
failure to declare dividends, or to maintain dividend rates already established,
failure to maintain a satisfactory financial
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condition, proposals to issue additional
shares, or other securities, to sell or mortgage property, or to enter into other contracts vitally affecting the life of the corporation, might be just reasons for enfranchising the investing shareholder. In
some instances the enfranchisement would
cover specific matters, and cease until
occasion again required similar action.
In other cases, the duration would depend
upon conditions.
Fundamental to the solution of the
voting problem is the matter of financial
information. A n investing shareholder,
if he is to exercise intelligent judgment,
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must have frequent and comprehensive
financial data which are known to be
accurate and dependable. The need for
information is the same whether in following his judgment he is moved to attack
the powers that be, or to disappear quietly
from the list of shareholders. He may
have been beguiled into buying non-voting
stock. There is no law which compels him
to retain it. If he is fortunate enough to
own stock which enables him to make his
voting power effective in financial matters,
he must know the financial facts surrounding matters on which he undertakes to act
or to lead others to action.

